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The primary focus of this article is to review the main obstacles in competition law 
enforcement in the European Union and to investigate how the development of 
collective redress could effectively facilitate enforcement of EU competition law. 
Arguably, antitrust enforcement remains sub-optimal due to the insufficient 
deterrent effect of EU antitrust fines and obstacles facing victims of competition 
law infringements in bringing damages actions. Central to my work, therefore, is 
the belief that collective actions constitute an attractive vehicle to solve, or at least 
diminish, the inefficiencies of antitrust enforcement. The paper explores some 
options as to how to design collective redress mechanisms in order to influence the 
ability to bring successful collective claims. This would, in turn, consider the 
advantages of opt-out collective actions in tackling the issues related to low 
participation rates, lack of funding and sub-optimal deterrence. From this 
perspective, the article moves on to propose collective actions as a potential remedy 
to facilitate access to justice, to deal with a wide range of legal and economic issues 




Antitrust Fines, Collective Redress, Competition Enforcement, Damages, EU 
Law. 
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European competition law is primarily enforced by public authorities – 
the European Commission at the EU level, and the national 
competition authorities (NCAs) at the national level. However, private 
enforcement is gaining popularity in Europe. Increased importance 
attributed to a more favourable legal regime of private enforcement has 
created more incentives for the European Commission to facilitate 
damages actions by removing perceived obstacles for victims of 
anticompetitive conduct. And yet, the discovery of the merits of private 
antitrust enforcement has culminated in the European Commission 
eventually concluding a package on private damages actions in 
antitrust cases in June 2013. The most important milestone was 
reached on 17 April 2014 when the European Parliament 
overwhelmingly adopted a Directive on antitrust damages actions1 for 
breaches of EU competition law in order to facilitate damages actions 
in the national courts of the EU’s Member States. Once the Directive is 
approved by the EU Council of Ministers, Member States will have two 
years to implement the provisions of the Directive in their national 
legal systems. The Directive seeks to ensure that victims of antitrust 
infringements can obtain effective compensation and to optimise the 
interaction between public and private enforcement of EU competition 
                                                
1 European Parliament, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union’ COM (2013) 404 final. Together it was published with: 
European Commission documents ‘Communication from the Commission on 
quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of article 101 or 102 of 
the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union’ [2013] OJ C167/07 and the 
Staff Working Document ‘Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for 
damages based on breaches of article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union’ [2013] SWD 205, 11.06.2013. The law is stated as 7 July 2014.  
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rules while at the same ensuring the protection of investigation tools, 
such as passing on, access to evidence and discovery rules, interaction 
with leniency. Surprisingly, the collective redress mechanism is not 
envisaged by this Directive. With a view to remedy this situation, the 
European Commission published a Recommendation on collective 
redress2 in relation to establishing a European horizontal framework 
for collective redress mechanisms. It is clear, however, that truly 
effective compensation may be somewhat limited, if binding collective 
redress procedures are not included, in particular for consumers who 
suffered a harm of low value. 
 
In the first place, this paper considers determination of the existing 
obstacles and shortcomings in competition law enforcement. First, 
designing the concept of effective deterrence of EU antitrust fines 
requires consideration of current statistics of the European 
Commission and building up on the central findings of the law and 
economics literature. 3  For the sake of simplicity, the economic 
calculations are based on the comparison of cartel overcharge and 
maximum possible fine. Second, it defines the reasons why private 
parties are not well equipped to enforce their rights. This target is 
achieved through analysing the common obstacles in cartel damage 
litigation that apply to all jurisdictions. In addition, this paper also 
argues that an effective antitrust enforcement should consider the 
option of framing private damage claims more directly as a means of 
deterrence. Central to my work, therefore, is the belief that an 
introduction of a unified system of collective redress, based on opt-out 
measures, might be an attractive alternative to enhance deterrence and 
to mitigate deficiencies of competition law enforcement.  
 
                                                
2 European Commission, ‘Recommendation on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States 
concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law’ [2013] OJ C3539/3). 
Together it was published with the ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress”’ COM (2013) 401/2. 
3 M Mariniello, ‘Do European Fines Deter Price Fixing?’ [2013] Bruegel Policy 
Review 4; F Smuda, ‘Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU 
Competition Law’ (2012) Centre for European Economic Research No. 12-050; M 
Boyer and R Kotchoni ‘How Much Do Cartels Typically Overcharge?’ (2012) 
CIRANO Scientific Series 15, Montreal. 
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The following questions will be clarified in this paper:  
 
1. Which factors can influence the design of successful 
collective redress?  
2. What is the potential added value of a unified model of 
collective redress based on opt-out measure for improving 
deterrence and effectiveness in the European competition law?  
3. To what extent can collective actions mitigate deficiencies 
of private enforcement by individual parties? 
4. How realistic is it that collective actions can facilitate EU 
competition law enforcement?  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of 
major obstacles and shortcomings in competition law enforcement. 
Section III determines the added value of collective redress for 
improving private damages claims, deterring anti-competitive conduct 
and enforcing EU competition law. Section IV shows that EU-style 
collective redress should be formed on an opt-out basis or at least on a 
hybrid of opt-out/opt-in, while the pure opt-in measure should be 
avoided. Section V intends to demonstrate that collective redress is a 
potential remedy to mitigate deficiencies of competition law 
enforcement. This work ends with a short conclusion summarizing key 
insights. 
 
 THE EXISTING OBSTACLES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN COMPETITION II.
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
This section provides an overview of the major obstacles of two 
enforcement models of competition law: on the one hand, public 
enforcement principally aimed at deterrence, and, on the other hand, 
private enforcement principally aimed at compensation. By drawing 
arguments from the current statistics from the European Commission 
and from the empirical results of law and economics, it is possible to 
identify first an insufficient deterrent effect of EU antitrust fines and to 
argue that these fines should be complemented with other measures to 
increase deterrence, in particular with more effective and more 
deterrence-oriented approach of damages claims. From this perspective, 
this chapter develops a better understanding of the reasons why private 
individuals are not well equipped to enforce their rights. 
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  Public Enforcement 1.
 
In the European Union, the imposition of fines and leniency programs 
are the principal means of increasing effectiveness of cartel prosecution 
and deterring infringers from engaging in anticompetitive behaviour. 
This discussion, however, will be limited to showing the impact of fine 
spectrum on deterrence while the debate on leniency is not taken into 
consideration.4 The fines guidelines were introduced by the European 
Commission in June 2006. 5  The major factor which concerns the 
deterrent effect of the fines imposed by the Commission is to set the 
fine based on firm’s annual sales and the duration of its alleged 
participation in the cartel. Under this mechanism, the Commission 
indicates that the maximum fine can only amount to up to 10% of the 
infringing undertaking’s worldwide turnover of the preceding business 
year.  
 
At the same time, useful insights regarding the current successes in 
more effective deterrence may be derived from the current statistics of 
the European Commission. There is evidence that the amount of fines 
imposed on convicted cartels has dramatically increased in the recent 
years. From 1990 up until March 2014, the European Commission 
imposed fines totalling 22.02 billion euros on companies engaged in 
                                                
4 This article intends to demonstrate that the major obstacle in EU competition law 
enforcement relates to insufficient effect of EU antitrust fines. Although the fines are 
already high, they do not effectively deter infringers from engaging in anticompetitive 
behaviour. It should be emphasized that leniency programs proved to be very 
successful in fighting cartels in the European Union. In essence, the leniency policy 
offers companies involved in a cartel – which self-report and hand over evidence – 
either total immunity from fines or a reduction of fines which the Commission would 
have otherwise imposed on them. The current EU leniency policy is set out in the EU 
Leniency Notice [2006] OJ C298/17 and continues the work of successful 2002 
Leniency Notice [2002] OJ C298/17); both of these replaced the less successful 1996 
Leniency Notice [1996] OJ C207/4). This is notably because the 2002 Leniency Notice 
facilitated conditions for full immunity from fines and set out to grant automatic 
immunity from fines to the first reporting cartel, while the 2006 Notice introduced 
the discretionary marker system. Both Leniency notices increased the rate of 
detection and significantly strengthened the deterrence. 
5  European Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed 
Pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003’ [2006] OJ C210/2. 
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cartel violation within the European Economic Area.6 The total amount 
of fines imposed on convicted cartels rose from 832 million euros over 
the period 1990 - 1999 to 12.8 billion euros over the period 2000 - 2009. 
The increasing trend in fining policy is also evident in the last 4-year 
period (2010 - 2014) during which the European Commission gradually 
fined of the total amount of 8,4 billion euros. Even at their 
unprecedented high level, the insufficient deterrent effect of the EU 
antitrust fines should be observed. During the last decade, the number 
of discovered cartels is increasing tremendously without any indication 
of slowing down. This is demonstrated by the fact that recently imposed 
fines are based on the new fine guidelines, which concern the aim for 
higher fines and thus deterrence. To make the discussion more fruitful, 
it should be observed that 9 of the top 10 fines have been in the last 6 
years. As regards the 10% threshold, it must be borne in mind that this 
legal maximum was attained in 4 large cases out of 13 fined in the last 
decade. 7  The resulting problem is that the fines calculated by the 
Commission had to be reduced. 
 
Furthermore, the law and economics literature estimates fine levels to 
be structurally below the adequate level to achieve optimal fine.8 Key 
parameters for calculating the deterrent effect of current fines are 
therefore the price increase (cartel overcharge) compared with the 
maximum possible fine. Relying on the results estimated by Smuda 
(given the upper limits of fine and probability of detection), the 
expected fine can sum up to a maximum of 11.46% of affected sales per 
year in comparison with a mean of overcharge rate of 21.9%.9 Under the 
                                                
6  European Commission, ‘Cartel Statistics’ (last updated 19 March 2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf> accessed 20 
December 2013. The fine statistics are not adjusted for Court judgments.  
7 M Allain, M Boyer, R Kotchoni and J Ponssard, ‘Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory 
and Evidence from the European Union’ (2013) CIRANO 2013s-24, 2 < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2342180> accessed 11 January 2014; 
for further discussion see also A Riley, ‘The Modernisation of EU Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement: Will the Commission Grasp the Opportunity?’ CEPS Special 
Report/January 2010 <http://aei.pitt.edu/14570/1/Modernisation_Final_e-version.pdf> 
accessed 18 February 2014.  
8  See for a thorough discussion Mariniello (n 3); Allain, Boyer, Kotchoni and 
Ponssard (n 7); Boyer and Kotchoni (n 3); Smuda (n 3); JM Connor and RH Lande, 
‘Cartel Overcharges and Optimal Cartel Fines’ (2008) 3 Competition Law and Policy 
2203.  
9 Smuda (n 3). To consider whether the collusion outweighs expected punishments 
author provides the following equation: OvRate(1) · (Pcollusion · x) < π · γ (Pcollusion · 
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estimated results, the overcharge rate is higher than the maximum 
possible fine; also, it demonstrates that the gain from collusion 
outweighs expected punishments. Furthermore, Connor finds a mean of 
overcharge rate of 50.4% for very successful cartels (so-called ‘Connor 
database’). To that extent, Boyer and Kotchoni amended the Connor 
database in order to determine more accurate results, whereby the 
estimation was reduced up to 45.5%. 10  In both scenarios, however, 
cartels are not deterred from the collusion even if the probability rate 
would be 100%.11 Other estimations found that in the period between 
2001-2012 cartels caused 18.4 billion euros worth of harm to the 
                                                                                                                                          
x). Here, π – the probability of detection, Pcollusion - the price during collusion, x – 
the amount of sold goods, OvRate(1) – the average overcharge rate over the entire 
cartel period, γ – maximum possible fine (30% + (25%: cartel duration). The upper 
limits of fine and probability of detection is 33% (0,33) while the average duration of 
cartel is 5,7 years.  As such, the average cartel can amount up to of maximum 0:33 · 
[30% + (25% : 5,7)] = 11:46% in comparison with a mean overcharge rate of 21.9% of 
selling price per year.    
10 For further discussion on Connor database and its amendment, see Boyer and 
Kotchoni (n 8). 
11 Connor and Lande (n 8) estimate state probabilities of detection ranging between 
10-33% in economic theory, while E Combe, C Monnier and R Legal calculate a range 
between 12.9 and 13.2% for the European market (see E Combe, C Monnier and R 
Legal, ‘Cartels: the Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union’ (2008) 
Bruges European Economic Research papers 12). Essentially the probability of 
detection takes on a major role in estimating the deterrent effect of EU antitrust 
policy. The magnitude of detection probability guides how the optimal sanction 
should be structured. This value is of particular importance for directors and/or 
managers who are willing to join or create a cartel. In addition, public authorities are 
better suited to design an optimal policy regarding the fight against cartels, if 
approximate probability rate is known. It seems clear that excluding the choice of 
detection from the EU antitrust enforcement would negatively affect the overall 
discussion on deterrent effect of current fines. This is notably because the 
determinants of deterrence include: i) the probability of detection ii) price during 
collusion iii) the amount of sold goods iv) the average overcharge rate. These 
elements are interchangeable; without one of them, the fine and deterrence 
estimation is impossible. Particularly, the introduction of leniency programs in the 
European Union has contributed to reinforce the probability of detection. Given the 
fact that full immunity is granted only to the first applicant, it causes lack of 
assurance within the cartel if slight deviations appear from the cartel plan, for 
instance the ‘empty chair example’. For further discussion, see JA Chavez, ‘The 
Carrot and the Stick Approach to Antitrust Enforcement’ [2006] Practising Law 
Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, May PLI Order No. 
8736.  
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European Economy, which seems extremely low in comparison with 
€209 billion of the total affected EEA sales.12    
 
Perhaps the most obvious solution would be to increase the fines as well 
as turnover for maximum of 10%. However, the input received through 
that increase might undermine the undertakings’ ability to pay, thereby 
inducing undesirable social costs (such as bankruptcy, losses of jobs and 
lessening competition in the market).13 It clearly emerges that current 
fine levels should be complemented with other measures to enhance 
deterrence. In fact, a more effective and more deterrence-oriented 
private enforcement should be considered. This may include a rule 
similar to the US’ trebling of antitrust damages under the Clayton Act14 
or opt-out collective redress mechanisms. Before delving into the details 
of these alternatives towards a more-deterrence-oriented approach, it is 
both necessary and instructive to review the existing obstacles in private 
antitrust enforcement.  
 
  Private Enforcement 2.
 
The Commission estimates that only 25% of the final cartel and antitrust 
prohibition decisions taken by the Commission in the period 2006-2012 
were followed by private damages actions.15 Moreover, far from reaching 
all victims, the majority of these actions were brought by large 
companies or public entities whereas SMEs and consumers normally 
                                                
12 Mariniello (n 3). The author observes that affected sales include sales by all 
market members (that is not necessarily cartel members). 
13 W Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ (2005) 28 World 
Competition 2, 148; L Talev, ‘What Threats Exist to the Successful Operation of the 
EU 2006 Leniency Notice?’ (2010) unpublished <www.varadinovlaw.com/en/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/clasf_paper_talev_leniency_final_10-09 2010.doc> accessed 5 
January 2014.  
14 The entirety of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 
(2009). Section 4 of the Clayton Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2009). See for a 
thorough discussion CL Sagers, Examples & Explanations: Antitrust (Aspen Publishers 
2011); RJR Peritz, Competition Policy in America: History, Rhetoric, Law (Oxford 
University Press 2001). 
15  European Commission, ‘Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Report: 
Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules Accompanying the proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union’ [2013] SWD 203 final, 
para. 52.  
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did not engage in legal actions for reparation of their harm. It can thus 
be stressed that the lack of effective compensation has created a 
considerable cost for the European consumers and businesses. Simple 
estimates that the cost of ineffective right to damages (so called 
‘foregone compensation’) for consumers and SMEs from hard-core 
cartels between 2006 and 2012 is in the range of 25 - 69 billion euros.16  
 
To enable a better understanding of the shortcomings of private 
enforcement, this discussion would reveal reasons why private parties 
are not well equipped to enforce their rights. There are indeed three 
main obstacles facing victims of competition law infringements in 
bringing damages actions: (i) cost and (legal) uncertainty, (ii) complexity 
of causality, and (iii) disclosure rules. Each of these factors will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
First, it is generally assumed that private individuals will only 
commence legal actions if they expect a positive cost-benefit ratio. With 
respect to antitrust damages claims, it is easy to recognize that private 
parties face large legal costs to start and develop their case, thereby legal 
proceedings often exceed the expenses of their claims, creating the so-
called ‘rational apathy’ problem. Further complicating the picture, in 
the European Union there is a predominant ‘loser pays’ principle.17 A 
crucial issue, in this respect, is that the judge applies the ‘loser pays’ 
principle on a case-by-case basis, meaning that the final decision is less 
predictable for the claimants. If the claim is unsuccessful, individual 
claimants face significant exposure to the other side’s costs. 18 
Furthermore, private parties stand isolated against large companies 
                                                
16 CE Mosso, ‘The Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions’ (Conference on ‘Antitrust Damages: the European Commission’s 
proposal’, Bruegel, Brussels, 20 June 2013). 
17 The ‘loser-pays’ principle is the most widely adopted allocation method for legal 
costs in the EU Member States. According to this principle, the losing party should 
pay the other party's legal costs (court and lawyers’ fees). Although this instrument is 
an effective safeguard against unmeritorious claims, but it actually exacerbates the 
problem of funding in private damages actions. The ‘loser pays’ principle is currently 
applied in all of the EU Member States, as well this principle is predominant in 
collective action mechanisms, if presently exist in the State.  
18 P Collins, ‘What are the Problems with EC Antitrust Damage Actions in Europe? 
Does the Private Pillar Require Reinforcement?’ (2007) unpublished 
<http://vartotojuteises.lt/content/download/412/2587/file/Philip%20Collins%20Paper.p
df.> accessed 10 January 2014.  
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because large and powerful companies have better legal support, 
resources and broader investigative powers. From this perspective, it 
should be observed that in less developed and smaller countries, for 
example in the Eastern Europe, business relations are more formal, 
meaning that private parties might be afraid to start a lawsuit against 
powerful firms because of potential retaliation. As regards consumers, 
they are often unaware that they are being, or have been, harmed by 
hard-core cartels (price-fixing, quantity limits or bid rigging). Even if 
consumers are aware of the infringement, the harm caused by price-
fixing cases, for example, often produce scattered and low-value damage 
to a multitude of consumers. As a consequence, only few of them can 
afford taking a legal action since the expected benefits outweigh the 
expected costs. 
 
The second characteristic feature of typical private antitrust cases is the 
fact-intensiveness and confrontation with complex causality 
assessments, both legal and economic. The principal purpose is to prove 
the causality between the antitrust infringement and the harm suffered 
by the claimant. The burden of proof typically lies with the claimant, 
who has to demonstrate that the infringing conduct has resulted in the 
damage claimed. This is a daunting task, particularly given that a 
majority of the Member States require proving causation with near 
certainty (99.9% probability).19 This burden is even more complicated, 
given the fact that claimants stand isolated against antitrust violators 
who generally are much more aware of the infringement. Even if 
damages actions were followed-on by a previous public antitrust 
decision, claimants still need to adduce clear evidence of causation and 
loss to recover damages. 20  Another issue that concerns assessing 
causation is the ‘but-for’ test. The test examines the hypothetical 
scenario if the infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU had not 
occurred: the assessment of the position of the injured party with the 
position in which this party would have been but for antitrust 
infringement (often referred as ‘counterfactual scenario’). Developing an 
actual counterfactual scenario requires evaluation of how the market 
evolved without the antitrust infringement. Estimation has to rely on a 
number of determinants: (i) market context; (ii) type of harm; and (iii) 
                                                
19 HA Abele, GE Kodek, GK Schaefer, ‘Proving Causation in Private Antitrust Cases’ 
(2013) 7 J of Competition Law & Economics 4, 848-49.  
20 See for example, case Enrol Coal Services Ltd v English Welsh & Scottish Railway 
Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 2. 
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types of claimants. Conducting such an analysis requires a thorough 
understanding of economic variables (such as prices, sales volumes, 
profits, costs or market shares). This is certainly not an easy task, given 
the fact that the results rely on many assumptions.21 Furthermore, the 
analysis of causation is an essential element for the quantification of 
actions for damages. Claimants often face difficulties in quantifying 
precisely the harm caused by the infringement of the competition law as 
a result of numerous factors, such as evidentiary obstacles, lack of access 
to information or robust estimation of damage.22  Furthermore, legal 
provisions for proving damages and causality are too general to be 
directly applicable to a private antitrust case.23 A separate standing issue 
is that the claimants are put off by the complex economic analysis; 
something which is a significant burden for private parties. The 
economics and financial literature has developed a wide array of 
methods and models for quantifying damages. For example, in the 
OXERA study prepared for the European Commission, the methods 
and models are classified into three broad groups: comparator-based, 
financial-performance-based, and market-structure-based. 24  For these 
reasons, it is argued that the whole causation procedure requires more 
resources and expenses to elaborate legal proceedings than is expected.  
 
                                                
21 See for example, Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and others v Council and 
Commission [2000] ECR I-203. The Court assessed the hypothetical scenario: ‘the loss 
of earnings is the result not of a simple mathematical calculation but of an evaluation 
and assessment of complex economic data. The Court is thus called upon to evaluate 
economic activities which are of a largely hypothetical nature. Like a national court, it 
therefore has a broad discretion as to both the figures and the statistical data to be 
chosen and also, above all, as to the way in which they are to be used to calculate and 
evaluate the damage’, para 79.  
22 I Lianos, D Geradin, Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforcement and 
Procedure (Edward Elgar Pub 2013), 255. 
23 Abele, Kodek and Schaefer (n 19), 853. 
24  Oxera, Quantifying Antitrust Damages, Study Prepared for the European 
Commission, December 2009 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf> 
accessed 14 July 2014. According to this study: 1) Comparator-based approaches use 
data from sources that are external to the infringement to estimate the counterfactual 
(cross-sectional comparisons, time-series comparisons and combination of both 
models); 2) Financial-analysis-based approaches use financial information on 
comparator firms and industries, benchmarks for rates of return, and cost 
information on defendants and claimants to estimate the counterfactual; 3) Market-
structure-based approaches use a combination of theoretical models, assumptions 
and empirical estimation.  
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The third characteristic concerns issues related with disclosure rules. As 
a general rule, much of key evidence is often held exclusively by the 
allegedly infringing undertakings, making it difficult for a claimant (if 
aware of the evidence at all) to obtain disclosure of documents. These 
materials are crucial in successful antitrust damages actions in which 
infringing conduct tends to be secretive. From the domestic perspective, 
the rules on disclosure vary between States making it difficult to assess 
whether and under what conditions the State is willing to give access to 
documents. In civil law countries (such as Germany, Lithuania or 
Austria) the rules on disclosure provides only limited access for the 
plaintiffs to the internal information of the defendants. Contrary to 
current shift in civil law countries, the disclosure rules in English courts 
have rigorous disclosure regimes in place, yet it requires parties to 
disclose documents that may help for claimants to prove the alleged 
overcharge they paid. 
 
In order to mitigate these deficiencies of private enforcement, the 
European Parliament eventually adopted the Directive on antitrust 
damages actions on 17 April 2014. The text was agreed between the 
European Parliament and the Council during the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Once the Directive is approved by the EU Council of 
Ministers, Member States will have two years to implement the 
provisions of the Directive in their national legal systems. As already 
pinpointed at in the introduction, from the perspective of consumer 
protection it is rather disappointing that the adopted text does not 
include any provisions on collective redress. In the area of antitrust 
where illegal behaviour may generate scattered and low-value loss to a 
number of consumers and where the individual proceedings may not be 
proportionate, the added value of a binding approach on collective 
redress would be a significant event. 
 
  Tort Remedies and Deterrence in European Private Antitrust 3.
Enforcement 
 
This paper argues that effective antitrust enforcement should consider a 
more active role of private damage claims more directly as a means of 
deterrence. An effective deterrence – comprising both of public and 
private enforcement – might guarantee that the antitrust violation never 
actually occurred. It clearly emerges that preventing anticompetitive 
conduct is the best way to ensure the welfare of consumers, competitors 
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and other market participants. Even if we assume that the Europeans 
developed a perfect private enforcement system, such a system cannot 
restore all the social benefits that stem from well-functioning 
competitive markets and that are lost when competition is lessened or 
distorted. 25  Therefore, if there is a conflict between the antitrust 
objectives, deterrence needs to prevail over compensatory objectives. 
 
However, the Commission observed that the pursued aim of private 
actions is mainly to serve as a compensatory function, while deterrence 
is viewed solely as an effect of enhancing public intervention tools. 
However, it is equally true that if private actions, of both the follow-on 
and standalone type, do not contribute through further deterrence, they 
serve the same function as the tort remedies have in national 
jurisdictions. 26  Furthermore, regulating tort actions traditionally 
remains the domain of domestic rules, and the Commission has stressed 
the alarming importance of the absence of a European Tort Law. More 
importantly, national tort actions proved to be practically ineffective in 
European antitrust enforcement. Basedow observes, in this respect, that 
‘the remedies provided by private law have turned out to be insufficient 
or even totally inadequate for the protection of competition’. 27  The 
matter is that actions in tort cannot have functions other than 
exclusively the compensatory one. It is necessary to go beyond mere 
compensation in order to achieve a more deterrence-oriented approach 
and thus effective antitrust enforcement. 
                                                
25 P Buccirossi and M Carpagnano, ‘Is it Time for the European Union to Legislate in 
the Field of Collective Redress in Antitrust (and how)?’ (2013) 4 Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 1, 13.  
26 E Camilleri, ‘A Decade of EU Antitrust Private Enforcement: Chronicle of a Failure 
Foretold?’ (2013) 34 Eur Competition L Rev 10, 533. The author observes that this 
situation implies for private law remedies to gain an unprecedented strategic 
position, in particular the one happens for the tort remedy. Although the current 
system sets private enforcement at the centre of the stage of antitrust enforcement, 
but it is seemingly unfit to play such a unprecedented strategic role. For further 
discussion on tort actions of antitrust enforcement, see F Marcos and A Graels, 
‘Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules: Harmonising Tort Law through the Back Door?’ (2008) 16 Eur Rev of Private L 
3; T Ottervanger, ‘Designing a balanced system: Damages, Deterrence, Leniency and 
Litigants’ Rights’ as cited in M Marquis (ed) ‘Perchance to Dream: Well Integrated 
Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in the European Union’ (2013) European 
University Institute, 18 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2371338> 
accessed 15 July 2014. 
27 J Basedow, Private enforcement of EC Commission (Kluwer International 2008), 1. 
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One option may include a rule similar to the US’ trebling of damages 
for infringements of antitrust law under the Clayton Act.28 Under this 
system, the successful plaintiffs are able to recover compensatory 
damages as much as three times of actual damages. As such, both 
deterrence and compensation functions are effectively pursued. It seems 
clear that awarding civil plaintiffs treble damages is a fuel for more 
active litigation in the EU. On this point it ought to be recalled that 
private damage action is is an economic activity for which funding is 
crucial to success or failure of any proceedings. Because of the 
predominance of the ‘loser pays’ principle in the Member States, 
feasible alternatives are required so as to incentivize private parties to 
start a claim. If successful claimants are able to recover compensatory 
damages as much as three times of actual damages, it definitely acts as 
an incentive to start a private claim. Furthermore, punitive damages are 
of particular importance in collective actions, where the total costs for 
bringing collective damages actions can be extremely high because of 
the complexity of legal and economic assessments in such cases, the 
involvement of multiple parties, and the difficulty in allocating the 
proceeds.29 
 
Regarding these factors it should be recalled that the European 
Commission also previously attempted to introduce double damages (a 
form of punitive damages) for horizontal cartels in the 2005 Green Paper 
on damages, but it was severely criticized by the Member States and was 
no longer included as a proposal in the 2008 White Paper. As a matter 
of EU jurisprudence, the CJEU acknowledged that the imposition of 
punitive damages in response to harm caused by antitrust violations 
would not be contrary to European public order.30 Despite the positions 
taken by the Court, punitive damages still seem to be an alien concept 
to the European litigation culture. First and foremost, punitive damages 
                                                
28 The US Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the private right of action for 
treble damages under the antitrust laws serves two purposes: compensating 
injured victims of unlawful conduct and attracting enforcement resources to 
supplement the government’s deterrence-oriented efforts. Further discussion of 
the treble damages regarding the objectives of compensation and deterrence, see 
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 US 630, 636 (1981);  Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 US 720, 746 (1977). 
29 C Leskinen, ‘Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules’ 
(2011) 8 CMLR 1, 95. 
30 Joined Cases C-295/04 to 298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-6619, [97] and [98]. 
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are in conflict with the fundamental principle of damages actions in the 
EU; that is to compensate for injury actually suffered.31 Second, punitive 
damages are also not in line with the general principles of Civil Law in 
the Member States, which prevent any unjust enrichment.32 Finally, in 
the United States where punitive damages are a motivating power in 
private enforcement, damages actions are intended to at least partly 
substitute for public enforcement actions while in the EU there is a 
clear distinction between the roles public and private enforcement. 
Notably, public enforcement serves the punitive objective-function. This 
function is pursued through the imposition of fines, which punish the 
infringers and deter them from breaching the law in the future. 
Conversely, private enforcement and more specifically damages actions 
primarily serve the objective of compensation, while deterrence is only 
seen as a welcome side-effect. It is agreed that punishment and 
deterrence are not the elements of civil remedies in the EU. For these 
reasons, punitive damages are generally considered incompatible with 
the public policy (ordre public).33 In addition, the award of punitive 
damages breaches the fundamental principle of ne bis in idem.34  
                                                
31 The Commission’s 2008 White Paper on damages for breach of EU competition 
law (COM (2008) 165) ruled that all victims of infringements of EC competition law 
have access to effective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated 
for the harm they suffered. Full compensation is, therefore, the first and foremost 
guiding principle. The Commission welcomes the confirmation by the Court of 
Justice of the types of harm for which victims of antitrust infringements should be 
able to obtain compensation. In the Manfredi case (n 30), the Court emphasised 
that victims must, as a minimum, receive full compensation of the real value of the 
loss suffered. The entitlement to full compensation therefore extends not only to 
the actual loss due to an anti-competitive price increase, but also to the loss of 
profit as a result of any reduction in sales and encompasses a right to interest, [95] 
and [97].  
32 The Court of Justice decided, in Case C-47/07 P, Masdar (UK) Ltd v Commission of 
the European Communities [2008] ECR I-9761, that a person who has suffered a loss 
which increases the wealth of another person without there being any legal basis 
for that enrichment has the right, as a general rule, to restitution from the person 
enriched, up to the amount of the loss. Legal redress for unjust enrichment, as 
provided for in the majority of national legal systems, is not necessarily 
conditional upon unlawfulness or fault with regard to the defendant’s conduct [44-
47]. As regards national jurisdictions, see, for instance, sec. 812-822 of German 
Civil Code; sec. 6.242 of Lithuanian Civil Code; sec. 1145 and 1158 of Spanish Civil 
Code.  
33 On December 1st 2010 The French Court de Cassation in case, Schlenzka v SA 
Fountain Pajot, case n°1090, held that ‘an award of punitive damages is not, per se, 
contrary to public policy, adding however that this principle does not apply when 




In formulating the concept of imperfect antitrust enforcement, it has 
been observed that current fine levels are sub-optimal to ensure 
deterrence. A logical implication of this remark would seem to be that 
since European antitrust follow-on actions constitute the tort remedies 
and given that the recovery of punitive damages is problematic in the 
EU, the unified model of collective redress is the most realistic 
alternative for a more deterrence-oriented approach. Another problem 
concerns procedural and legal obstacles due to which private parties are 
not well equipped to enforce their rights. From this perspective, it 
seems that collective redress is also a potential remedy to mitigate the 
deficiencies of private antitrust enforcement by individual parties. 
 
 COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POTENTIAL III.
VEHICLE TO MITIGATE OBSTACLES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
 
This section aims to provide arguments as to why collective redress is an 
attractive alternative to solve, or at least diminish, the inefficiencies of 
antitrust enforcement. First, it explains the particular milestones that 
affect the ability to bring successful collective claim. Furthermore, it 
aims to provide an initial characterization of the ability of collective 
claims to act as an incentive for deterrence. Finally, it demonstrates that 
collective redress is a potential remedy to mitigate deficiencies of private 
antitrust enforcement by individual parties. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
the amount awarded is disproportionate with regard to the damage sustained and 
the debtor's breach of his contractual obligations’. Taking the example of 
prohibition of punitive damages in Germany, see RA Schütze, ‘The Recognition 
and Enforcement of American Civil Judgments Containing Punitive Damages in 
the Federal Republic of Germany’ (1989) U Pennsylvania J of Int Business L 11(3). 
34 The legal principle of ne bis in idem restricts the possibility of a defendant being 
prosecuted repeatedly for the same cause of action. The English Court in case, 
Devenish etc. v. Sanofi -Aventis etc., [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch), held that the principle of 
ne bis in idem precludes the award of exemplary or punitive damages. For further 
discussion, see W Wils, ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement 
and Private Actions for Damages’ (2009) World Competition 32(1), 21-22; W Wils, 
‘The Principle of Ne Bis in Idem in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis' (2003) 26 World Competition, 131.   
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  Legal Design of Collective Redress Mechanisms 1.
 
From the European standpoint, the last few years have seen rapid 
developments in the area of collective redress in the Member States. 
Currently, twenty states have their own collective redress schemes.35 
However, even where it is available, the implemented systems have not 
been very successful because the number of collective actions is very 
low. Based on the results provided by the Lear Study,36 to date there 
have been collective redress cases for antitrust infringements in only six 
countries while the trial stage has been reached only in Austria, Spain, 
France, and the UK. It emerges clearly that the ability to bring a 
successful collective claim depends on the type of collective actions 
introduced, particularly whether it provides sufficient incentives to 
bring collective action and possibilities for funding. 
 
The first and foremost feature in antitrust regards how precisely 
claimants need to be identified for an action before the court: on an opt-
in or an opt-out basis. Most of the countries have adopted opt-in 
mechanisms which require explicit consent from the victims to join the 
action. The major reason that inspired the Member States to choose an 
opt-in model is that there are advantages of limiting the risk of 
unmeritorious actions. Furthermore, an opt-in measure respects an 
individual right to be part of the litigation or not (so-called ‘party 
disposition principle’), whereby this measure is under the Article 6 of 
the ECHR. However, few countries (the UK, Portugal, Denmark and the 
Netherlands) have adopted ‘opt-out’ measure, whereby victims are 
deemed included in the action unless someone declares himself or 
herself not to be involved. A second feature concerns legal standing for 
the entities that might be allowed to start a collective action.37 In some 
                                                
35 Buccirossi and Carpagnano (n 25), 4.  
36 Lear Study, ‘Collective Redress in Antitrust’, Study for the European Parliament 
DG Internal Policies department A (2012) 
<http://www.learlab.com/EN/publications.html> or <http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/committees/en/studies.html> accessed 22 February 2014. 
37 Under the Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU (n 2), the Member States 
should designate representative entities to bring representative actions on the 
basis of clearly defined conditions of eligibility. These conditions should include 
at least the following requirements: (a) the entity should have a non-profit making 
character; (b) there should be a direct relationship between the main objectives of 
the entity and the rights granted under Union law that are claimed to have been 
violated in respect of which the action is brought; and (c) the entity should have 
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countries group actions can be commenced by public authorities, for 
instance in Finland (Ombudsman) and Hungary (Hungarian 
Competition Authority), whilst in other jurisdictions, such as France, 
Sweden and Greece, representation is provided by national private 
organizations, such as consumer associations. Other countries have legal 
standing for a combination of a mixed approach: private organizations 
and harmed persons (Bulgaria, Italy, Spain, and the UK), public 
authorities and associations (eg the Netherlands). A third option 
involves funding of legal costs that may affect the ability and the 
incentives of claimants to initiate collective actions. A potential solution 
concerns the availability of contingency and conditional fees. This 
mechanism represents the American solution to the funding problem. 
Under this mechanism, the necessary means of funding are well ensured 
because client pays contingent fees to a lawyer only if there is a 
favourable result. However, it is equally true that contingency fees bring 
incentives for unmeritorious claims. Despite this fact, contingency fees 
have increased its popularity, utilized in some fashion in 12 out of 27 
Member States (even if not in a pure US version) and now form permit 
arrangements between some claimants and their lawyers on the basis of 
some form of success fee. 38  England and Wales, for instance, have 
adopted conditional fee arrangements under which lawyers can obtain a 
success fee in addition to the initial legal fee, which is usually around 
25-50% of an awarded judgment if they win. 39  Lawyers do not get 
anything if they lose and only get a normal fee indexed on the hourly 
billing plus a success fee which cannot exceed the normal fee. These 
conditional fees are linked to an ‘after-the-event insurance’, which 
would pay the adversarial party’s costs in the event of losing the case. 
Another solution includes third-party funding (a company, bank or 
hedge fund), which could pay all or a part of the costs of an action in 
                                                                                                                                          
sufficient capacity in terms of financial resources, human resources, and legal 
expertise, to represent multiple claimants acting in their best interest. 
38 Buccirossi and Carpagnano (n 25), 6. 
39 CEPS, EUR and LUISS, ‘Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the 
EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios’, Report for the European Commission 
DG COMP/2006/A3/012, Final Report, Brussels, Rome and Rotterdam, 208 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_st
udy.pdf> accessed 14 July 2014. Recent reports in the UK support the need for an 
effective funding mechanism for litigation. For further debate on this topic, see 
further the recent report ‘Review of Expenses and Funding of Civil Litigation in 
Scotland’ (2013) <http://scotland.gov.uk/About/Review/taylor-review/Report> accessed 
15 July 2014.  
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exchange to retain a share of a successful claims.40 In England and 
Wales, external financial options are being offered by diverse investors. 
In 2012, there were ten active dedicated TPLF investors operating in the 
U.K., with three additional investors, Juridica, Burford, and IMF, 
making occasional investments. Most funders operating in the U.K. are 
relatively new, with the exception of Allianz, which has been funding 
claims since 2002.41 
 
 ASSESSMENT: OPT-IN VS OPT-OUT IV.
 
The European Commission recommends that collective redress in the 
EU should be based on the opt-in model, while the opt-out should be 
‘justified by reasons of sound administration of justice’.42 According to 
the Commission, the opt-in measure should be preferred because it: 
 
• limits the risk of abusive litigation and unmeritorious 
claims;  
• preserves the principle of party disposition; and 
• guarantees that the judgment will not bind other potentially 
qualified claimants who did not join.   
 
On the other hand, the opt-in measure tends to result in a low 
participation rate because the victims must express their wish to join the 
collective action, thus requiring them to spend time and money to start 
and develop the case. As such, it is unlikely that all victims will 
participate in collective action under the opt-in measure; as such, the 
compensatory objective is not achieved effectively. Several cases in 
national jurisdictions regarding the experiences of consumer 
organisations clearly indicate that opt-in collective actions are 
practically unworkable. Taking the example of the UK, the Replica 
Football Shirts case43 demonstrates the reluctance of consumers to take 
part in opt-in proceedings. The consumer association (Which?) brought 
an action in the collective interest of consumers who overpaid for 
football shirts due to a price-fixing cartel. Despite its efforts, Which? 
                                                
40 Leskinen (n 29), 95-96. 
41 C Veljanovski, ‘Third-Party Litigation Funding in Europe’ (2012) 8(3) J of L, 
Economics & Policy, 410-413. 
42 European Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU (n 2); Articles 21-25 stress the 
need to form claimant party by ‘opt-in’ principle.  
43 Case No 1078/7/9/07 Consumers Association v. JJB Sports Plc [2009] CAT 2.  
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managed to collect claims for only 600 consumers, which was 
considered a very low proportion of victims who suffered harm by the 
anti-competitive behavior. After this failure, Which? announced they 
would not take part in collective actions in the future if it is based on 
the opt-in measure. In France, the finding of a price-fixing agreement 
among three mobile operators (Orange France, SFR, and Bouygues 
Telecom) had a potentially negative impact on 20 million consumers.44 
However, consumer association UFC Que Choisir only managed to collect 
claims for 12,350 consumers. Hence, in countries where consumer 
associations have standing to bring damages claims, an opt-in model 
seems to be inappropriate to ensure sufficient participation rate for 
victims, in particular for cases involving multiple claims of low value 
(such as the harm caused by price fixing). In addition, in large-scale 
cartel agreements it is impossible in practice to get the consent of all 
harmed consumers, in particular when consumers cannot be easily 
identified. Due to low participation rate, consumer organizations pose a 
considerable obstacle of limited financial resources, thus limiting 
themselves to bringing damages actions due to uncertain financial 
perspective.   
 
In such circumstances, this paper argues that opt-out collective actions 
are better suited to tackle the issues related with low participation rates, 
lack of funding and sub-optimal deterrence. In the first place, an opt-
out scheme generally ensures that the group of claimants will be 
sufficiently large since the action is brought on behalf of the whole 
group, unless someone declares not to be involved. Taking the example 
of the US, an average opt-out rate is very low (less than 0.2%) in 
consumer class actions, since in any case these claims cannot be 
litigated individually. 45  In other words, opt-out collective actions 
increase access to justice, in particular for consumers involved in 
multiple claims of low value. It must be added, however, that the ones 
who are likely to opt-out are large companies or the individuals who 
have suffered significant harm. In addition, if the consumer association 
                                                
44 C Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal 
Systems. A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe (Hart Publishing 2008), 
84. 
45 For further discussion on opt-out rates, see T Eisenberg and G Miller, ‘The Role of 
Opt-outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues’ 
(2004) New York University Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04–004; S 
Issacharoff, ‘Preclusion, Due Process and the Right to Opt-out’ (2002) 77 Notre Dame 
L Rev 1057, 1060. 
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is designated and membership fees are used for financing litigation, the 
budget of the action depends on the members' willingness to pay fees. 
The members are required to be a part of the consumer association and 
to pay membership fees to receive damages. As such, an opt-out model 
seems to be a more realistic alternative to ensure the action for damages 
financially viable due to a larger group of claimant willing to pay fees. 
 
Furthermore, the preference given to opt-out schemes are likely to score 
better in terms of deterrence. As it is clear, the deterrence of collective 
redress depends on the size of the group of victims. If only a limited 
number of victims joined the proceedings, the deterrence will remain 
sub-optimal. Since the group of victims is larger under the opt-out 
measure, the size of the sanction expected under an opt-out system will 
be larger than under an opt-in system. As such, collective redress 
actions, based on an opt-out measure, can more effectively influence the 
potential companies’ willingness to violate competition rules in the 
future. But if a company has already become part of a cartel, it can 
influence their tactics and negotiations as well as the amounts to be 
obtained in a settled action.46 Whatever approach is taken, this paper 
argues that giving the right to consumer associations to claim damages 
on behalf of end-consumers gives impetus for the substantial deterrent 
effect. The potential cartelist will know that he might face private 
actions from consumers and the expected cost of the infringement will 
increase, and this combination of factors might act as an incentive for 
cartelists to contemplate twice before violating the competition rules. 
 
Despite the positive aspects, opt-out proceedings also have two potential 
disadvantages. First, this measure might jeopardize the right of access to 
the courts under Article 6 of the European Convention for Human 
Rights (ECHR).47 Second, the opt-out measure may increase the number 
                                                
46 DL Tzakas, ‘Effective Collective Redress in Antitrust and Consumer Protection 
Matters: a Panacea or a Chimera?’ (2011) 48 Common Market L Rev, 1136; R Korobkin 
and C Guthrie, ‘Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: an Experimental 
Approach’ (1994) 93 Michigan L Rev, 107. 
47 Article 6 para. 1 ECHR establishes that ‘in the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’. On the contrary, the opt-out mechanism requires that a 
deliberate action is taken to withdraw from a judicial action. Therefore uninformed 
people may find themselves bound by a judgment they did not even know was about 
to be issued. For further discussion, see Lear Study (n 36). 
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of unmeritorious claims. For these reasons, the introduction of an EU-
style collective redress mechanism could also be combined with the 
flexible hybrid of the opt-in/opt-out systems. The inspiration might be 
drawn from the examples of the UK and from the Danish model. In 
2014, The Consumer Right Bill 48  extended the jurisdiction of the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in the UK. First and foremost, the 
CAT has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a collective action 
should proceed on an opt-out or opt-in basis.49 Second, the CAT is 
permitted to authorize a person or entity to commence collective actions 
regardless of being a public or a specified body. However, opt-out 
collective actions are not permitted to be brought by law firms. Another 
innovative provision is that the Bill established a collective settlement 
procedure in the CAT which encourages settlements.50 If the settlement 
is reached, it has a binding effect on consumers, unless they opt-out. 
Besides the UK, another inspirational example of an opt-out class action 
system includes the one in Denmark. Opt-in group actions can be 
brought either by individual claimants, by any representative 
organization or by the Consumer Ombudsman. However, the judge may 
be granted, on a case-by-case basis, the discretion as to whether the opt-
out model is necessary to guarantee that a significant proportion of 
injured parties are compensated for the damages suffered.51 The Danish 
                                                
48 Consumer Rights Bill (HC Bill 29), Second reading - the general debate on all 
aspects of the Bill - took place on 1 July. This stage is a formality that signals the start 
of the Bill's journey through the Lords. The Bill aims to make consumers better 
informed and better protected when they’re buying. Online version is available here: 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0029/lbill_2014-
20150029_en_1.htm.> The law is stated as 7 July 2014.  
49 Schedule 8, para 5 of the Consumer Rights Bill (HC Bill 29). The Competition 
Appeals Tribunal (CAT) can already hear opt-in collective actions under the 
existing section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 (CA 98).  Paragraph 5 of the 
Consumer Rights Bill replaces section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 so as to 
provide space for opt-out collective proceedings, as well as continuing to provide 
for opt-in collective proceedings.  
50 The function of a collective settlement regime is to introduce a procedure for 
infringements of competition law, where those who have suffered a loss and the 
alleged infringer may jointly apply to the CAT to approve the settlement of a 
dispute on an opt-out basis. The collective settlement regime will operate on the 
same opt-out principles as the opt-out collective proceedings. 
51 The Danish Administration of Justice Act (2007). For further discussion, see E 
Werlauff, Class Actions in Denmark, (2009) 622 Annals of the American Academy of 
Political & Social Science 202.  Opt-out class actions are only permitted as an 
exception to the main rule stipulated in Section 254 e, subsection 5 of The 
Administration of Justice Act: 1) the constituent claims must be so small that they are 
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rules prescribe that only a public authority (the Consumer Ombudsman) 
can take opt-out cases to court.52 In the light of these statements, it is 
argued that the EU-style collective redress should be formed on the opt-
out basis or at least on the hybrid of opt-out/opt-in, while the pure opt-
in measure should be avoided. 
 
 Legal Framework for Opt-Out Collective Redress in Antitrust 1.
  
Bearing in mind the diversity of national antitrust rules, opt-out (or 
hybrid of opt-out/opt-in) collective actions should apply at national level 
that follow the same basic principles throughout the EU, taking into 
account the legal traditions of the Member States and safeguarding 
against abuse. Contrary to the Recommendation on collective redress, 
this paper argues that a sector-specific measure should be adopted for 
collective redress in antitrust. A sector-specific measure ensures better 
uniformity among the Member States in relation to Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. The critical idea underlying the horizontal initiative is that this 
mechanism requires further sector-specific implementation in national 
jurisdictions (in antitrust matters, for example, access to evidence, 
passing on and interaction between public and private enforcement of 
EU antitrust rules). With reference to a collective redress mechanism, a 
more suitable legislative act for a sector-specific initiative in EU 
competition law would be a directive rather than a regulation. A sector-
specific mechanism laid down in a directive would comply with the 
                                                                                                                                          
unlikely to be brought as individual actions because the risk or cost of litigation is 
disproportionate to the size of the individual claims; 2) the court must deem an opt-in 
structure to be unfit for the action at hand. If the conditions are met, then the 
Administration of Justice Act Section 254 e, subsection 8 grants the possibility of 
using the opt-out mechanism. The legislative history indicates that the number of 
opt-out cases was expected to be very limited, and practice to date in Denmark has 
also shown this prediction to be correct. The major case, against Bank Trelleborg 
Sagerne 356/2010 og 28/2011 (online version in Danish is available here: 
http://www.domstol.dk/hojesteret/nyheder/Afgorelser/Pages/DomibankTrelleborg-
gruppesgsmlet.aspx) failed in the Supreme Court after several years. It was thus 
emphasized that it must be clear that the claims would not otherwise be pursued, and 
they must be of modest size, as noted, less than 2,000 kroner.  
52 Cf. Section 28(1) of the Marketing Practices Act, under which, if a majority of 
consumers have the same claim for compensation in connection with a breach of 
the Marketing Practices Act, the consumer ombudsman can, on request, group the 
claims under one. Section 28(2) provides that the ombudsman can be appointed 
group representative in a class action lawsuit (cf. Ch. 23a of the Administration of 
Justice Act). 
2014] Obstacles in EU Competition Law Enforcement     148 
 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and it would be more 
respectful for national procedural autonomy. A directive, furthermore, 
would be a flexible instrument for introducing a minimum standard in 
any area of national law and avoid intervention in domestic provisions. 
This is of particular importance for the functioning of damages actions, 
ensuring common minimum guarantees all across the EU while leaving 
to the Member States the choice of the most appropriate tools to do so.53 
In view of the chosen instrument for the Directive on damages actions, 
it would be more appropriate to stick to the same form of instrument 
towards a coherent European approach to collective redress. 
Furthermore, given the fact that collective redress is a highly debatable 
and sensitive topic at the EU and national level, a regulation seems one 
step too far, because it might interfere with domestic systems. From a 
technical point of view, the Article 103 TFEU appears to be the most 
suitable Treaty provision with the CJEU case law in antitrust that 
requires that every legislative act should be based on one single legal 
basis. 54  Also a legislative initiative under Article 103 TFEU (besides 
antitrust specificities) would pave the legal background for both cross-
border and national litigation, while the positive effects would also 
extend to both SMEs and consumers. Needless to say, a dual legal basis 
consisting of Articles 103 and 114 TFEU could also be an alternative in 
antitrust collective redress. On deeper consideration, however, the 
interface between these provisions might be incompatible between the 
ordinary legislative procedure provided for by Article 114 TFEU and the 
special legislative procedure provided for by Article 103 TFEU. 
 
 COLLECTIVE REDRESS AS A POTENTIAL REMEDY TO MITIGATE V.
DEFICIENCIES OF EU COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
In the following section, it is demonstrated that collective redress is a 
potential remedy to mitigate deficiencies of competition law 
enforcement, including but not limited to: i) access to justice; ii) proving 
causation; and iii) insufficient public enforcement of EU competition 
law.  
 
First, the availability of collective actions in national legal systems may 
facilitate access to justice by creating measures which simplify and help 
                                                
53 Lear Study (n 36); Buccirossi and Carpagnano (n 25) 8-9.  
54 See for instance, Case C- 242/87 Commission v. Council (ERASMUS) [1989] ECR 
1425.  
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access to the courts. Collective actions would ensure a fundamental 
right for victims, namely in that legal representation is provided for a 
group of victims in order to ensure equality of arms.55 This is notably 
because of the potential to reduce the organizational costs and to handle 
the financial risks attached to private litigation. The costs of the lawsuit 
decrease because the financial risk is spread over a group of injured 
persons participating in the collective procedure. It means that plaintiffs 
no longer run the risk of having to bear extensive costs of the lawsuit. 
Furthermore, the probability of winning the case increases since 
multiple plaintiffs have larger financial means to pay for experienced 
and highly competent lawyers in the relevant fields of law, while 
individual consumers may not be able to afford on representatives with 
such a level of expertise.56 
 
Second, collective redress provides an attractive ability to bundle 
multiple individual claims and thus to gain efficiencies by tackling 
common legal, factual and economic issues collectively (and giving the 
claimants more clout against the defendants). In cases where an 
authorized consumer association files a claim on behalf of its members, 
it might reverse the insurmountable burden of proof from the plaintiff 
to their own hands.57 It is clear that consumer associations have larger 
financial means to start and develop antitrust cases, for example, to 
cover legal fees and potential expert fees. Furthermore, the availability 
of representative actions could greatly solve, or at least diminish, 
information asymmetry, meaning that plaintiffs are in a better position 
to provide proof with sufficiently high probability. Therefore, 
representative action by a consumer association may have the 
informational advantages of the applicable laws in comparison with 
individual consumers, such that designated bodies are able to assess 
better whether certain behaviour of firms constitutes an infringement.58 
In addition, it is argued that consumer associations may facilitate the 
analysis of the but-for test. In order to conduct such an analysis, the 
                                                
55 See, for instance, Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone 
and others v Conseil des ministers [2007] ECR I-5305, [31].  The European Court of 
Justice ruled that the right to be represented by a lawyer is indispensable for a fair 
civil proceeding according to Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention.  
56  R Van den Bergh and L Visscher, ‘The Preventive Function of Collective 
Actions’ (2008) 1 Erasmus L Rev 2, 19.   
57 Abele, Kodek, Schaefer (n 19), 851. 
58 Van den Bergh and Visscher (n 56), 19.   
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claimant has to have thorough understanding of the relationship 
between prices and their determinants, including the potential impact 
of the antitrust violation.59 It is clear that the complexity of methods and 
models for assessing the but-for test might be too complicated for 
private parties, especially for consumers. As such, collective actions are 
attractive alternative to determine the real damage value as closely as 
possible which that is embedded in the full-compensation principle. 
 
Third, collective redress is a potential tool to mitigate dysfunctional 
compensatory mechanisms of EU competition law. It should be 
observed that public authorities alone are not able to enforce 
competition law effectively because they lack resources and competence 
to secure compensations for victims. As mentioned before, truly 
effective compensation by the way of private enforcement is limited, 
because private parties face significant obstacles in bringing damages 
actions. In such circumstances, the collective redress mechanism seems 
a useful aid to antitrust enforcement through creating the enlarged 
group of enforcers able to claim their rights granted under EU law. 
Moreover, if a collective redress mechanism is established, then it has to 
increase the part played by national competition authorities and 
national courts in implementing EU and national competition law while 
guaranteeing its effective and uniform application. Finally, the collective 
redress approach also involves the matter of antitrust enforcement 
between the Member States. The common collective redress would 
facilitate inter-European antitrust enforcement in three different ways: 
  
1. Claimants in one Member State are able to access redress 
mechanisms in other Member States when they have suffered a 
detriment.  
2. Claimants are provided with clear and predictable means of 
recognizing and enforcing judgments from other Member 
States.   
3. Likewise, representative bodies based in one Member State 
are able to take or facilitate action on behalf of affected 
claimants in another Member State. 
 
This envisages the consumer protection against rogue traders across the 
borders since consumer bodies and national enforcement authorities 
would be built upon judicial cooperation between different Member 
                                                
59 Abele, Kodek, Schaefer (n 19), 854. 
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States.60  If such a system were to be developed, the cases with cross 




The current orientation of public antitrust authorities is to stress 
deterrence when imposing cartel fines. Even at their unprecedented 
high level, current antitrust fines against cartels seem to be insufficient 
to ensure deterrence. First, the increasing number of discovered cartels 
and increasing fines show that the existing fines may not be enough to 
persuade cartelists to abide the law. Second, recent law and economics 
literature estimates that the gain from collusion outweighs the expected 
punishments, even given the upper limits of a possible fine and the 
probability of detection in calculating the deterrence of antitrust fines. 
As such, it was argued that current fine levels should be complemented 
with other measures to enhance deterrence, in particular a more 
deterrence-oriented private enforcement. However, in as much as 
private enforcement framed upon competition law, it serves primarily a 
compensation function while deterrence is viewed as a welcome side-
effect. From this perspective, this paper observed three main obstacles 
facing victims of competition law infringements in bringing damages 
actions: (i) cost and (legal) uncertainty; (ii) complexity of causality; and 
(iii) disclosure rules. Collective redress mechanisms appeared to be an 
attractive alternative to solve, or at least diminish, the inefficiencies of 
antitrust enforcement: sub-optimal deterrence and ineffective damages 
claims. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of collective claim depends on 
the type of collective actions introduced and whether it provides 
sufficient incentives to bring collective action and possibilities for 
funding. 
 
First, it was observed that opt-in collective actions are practically not 
workable in national jurisdictions. In such circumstances, this paper 
argued that an opt-out nature of collective action is better suited to 
tackle the issues related with low participation rates, lack of funding and 
sub-optimal deterrence. However, opt-out proceedings, at least in the 
                                                
60  The Law Society of England and Wales, ‘Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress’ (2011) ETI Registration number: 24118193117-34, 13; 
‘Cooperation between Member States for Consumer Protection’ (Europa Website) 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/protection_of_consumers/l320
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Commission’s expectations, might jeopardize the right of access to the 
courts under Article 6 of the ECHR and might increase the number of 
unmeritorious claims. In the light of these statements, it was argued that 
the EU-style collective redress should be based primarily on the opt-out 
basis or at least on the hybrid of opt-out/opt-in, while the pure opt-in 
measure should be avoided.  
 
Second, as regards the deficiencies of private enforcement by individual 
parties, it was demonstrated that collective actions in national legal 
systems may therefore facilitate access to justice by creating measures 
which simplify and help access to the courts. Furthermore, collective 
redress provides an attractive vehicle to deal with a wide range of legal 
and economic methods for proving causation. In cases where an 
authorized consumer association files a claim on behalf of its members, 
it might reverse the insurmountable burden of proof from the plaintiff 
to their own hands. Finally, collective redress is an effective tool to 
mitigate dysfunctional enforcement by public authorities. This is 
remarkably because the collective redress mechanism is a useful aid to 
public enforcement through creating the enlarged group of enforcers 
able to claim their rights granted under EU law. 
 
Given the possible attractiveness of opt-out collective actions, the 
binding collective redress procedures in antitrust has to be included in 
the legal framework of EU competition law. Opt-out collective actions 
applying at national levels should follow the same basic principles 
throughout the EU for the sake of consistency across the EU. Contrary 
to the Recommendation on collective redress, this paper argues that a 
sector-specific measure should be adopted for collective redress in 
antitrust. From this perspective, a more effective legislative act for a 
sector-specific initiative in EU competition law would be a regulation 
rather than a directive. From a technical point of view, Article 103 
TFEU, which requires that every legislative act should be based on one 
single legal basis, appears to be the Treaty provision that is most 
compatible with the CJEU case law in the field of antitrust. According 
to the plan of a package on private damages actions, the Member States 
have to put in place the principles set out in the Recommendation by 
June 2015. After that, the Commission will assess the impact of its 
Recommendation, and based on the results of this, decide whether 
further measures are necessary. The binding measure on collective 
redress is expected in 2017. For these reasons, it will be interesting to 
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follow the recent developments in the UK, where a limited opt-out 
provision into the collective action regime is going to be introduced 
together with the Consumer Rights Bill in 2014. If it can work effectively 
without abusive litigation, this approach could inspire the Commission 
for a more assertive approach on collective redress. 
